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vAbstract
Toward Privacy-Preserving Emergency Access in EHR Systems with
Data Auditing
Muhannad Darnasser
Supervising Professor: Dr. Rajendra K. Raj
Widespread adoption of health information sharing is claimed to improve healthcare qual-
ity at reduced cost due to the ability for providers to share healthcare information rapidly,
reliably, and securely. During emergency access, however, such sharing may affect patient
privacy adversely and steps must be taken to ensure privacy is preserved. Australia and the
US have taken different approaches toward health information sharing. The Australian ap-
proach broadly uses a “push” model where a summary record is extracted from local health
records, and pushed into a centralized system accessed by providers. Under the US ap-
proach, providers during emergency access generally “pull” health records from a central-
ized system that typically replicates local health records. On the other hand, the centralized
repository most likely will be a third party cloud provider that offers on demand availability
of high quality and cost effective services. These features make cloud computing a perfect
infrastructure for EHR systems. The fact that medical data are handled and managed by a
third party cloud provider, however, requires additional security mechanisms, i.e. auditing,
to preserve data confidentiality, integrity, and privacy. This thesis contrasts the Australian
and US approaches to information sharing during emergency access, focusing on patient
privacy preservation. It develops a generalized approach to enhance patient privacy during
vi
emergency access using “push” and “pull” approaches. It presents an auditing service im-
plementation over a multi-cloud data repository. It finally shows preliminary results from
a proof-of-concept EHR system.
vii
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The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act
supports the concepts of Electronic Health Record (EHR) and Health Information Ex-
change (HIE). Healthcare providers and organizations that show “meaningful use” of these
technologies receive incentive payments, thus helped to increase usage of EHR systems in
the U.S. among providers [26]. By 2012, almost 48% providers were e-prescribing on an
e-prescription network. EHR systems play a major role in health data sharing, which has
shown to improve the quality of healthcare services, increase efficiencies, provide cost sav-
ings, and most importantly, help save lives in emergency situations by permitting healthcare
providers deliver the best emergency care in the shortest time.
Healthcare providers are permitted under the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule [23] to access critical patient data without prior consent
in emergencies, but only for the purposes of patient treatment. Accessing such medical
data electronically allows providers to deliver an efficient emergency treatment. Consider
a situation where Bob got into an accident and reached an emergency center in a nearby
hospital unconscious. The emergency room doctor cannot provide an effective treatment
without knowing Bob’s current medications, any allergies, and other medical problems,
e.g., diabetes. With the availability of emergency care systems, the doctor can use patient
identification information to access any required information immediately and provide the
2needed treatment. Without such information at hand, the doctor would first need to get the
required tests performed before providing treatment. In other words, having access to EHR
data during emergencies saves time, reduces errors, and results in improving healthcare.
Despite these benefits, accessing health data during emergency situations faces chal-
lenges in preserving patient privacy due to the reduced impact of privacy regulations in
such situations. Healthcare organizations face internal and external threats, however, inter-
nal threats have been the most common [20]. In the US, medical data breaches costs $234
billion annually estimated by FBI [27]. Emergency access represents one of the easiest
methods to access unauthorized data because the hacker needs only to provide a plausi-
ble reason for access. Since patient data contains not only medical related data but often
management, financial, and personal data, the damage due to such breaches can be huge
for both the patient and organization. A common fraud is medical identity theft where “a
person uses someone else’s medical record to obtain medical goods or services or to bill
for medical goods and services that the patient did not receive” [27]. This kind of fraud
often occurs by exposing non-medical data. For example, an incident where 2252 medical
records were accessed improperly by one or more employees when patients visited emer-
gency departments at three Central Florida hospitals between January 1, 2010 and August
15, 2011. Non-medical data such as patient names, social security numbers, dates of birth,
and insurance information were exposed [1].
Approaches toward the implementation of EHR systems varies between giving health-
care providers the ability to control which health data is extracted and “pushed” into a cen-
tral health data repository, or replicating local health data, that are stored and maintained
in healthcare providers offices, into a central repository to be “pulled” by other healthcare
providers. Generally, Australia adopts the first model while the U.S. follows the second
approach [15].
3Our system focuses on separating emergency data from the core of EHR systems, in
order to minimize the amount of leaked data in cases of emergency access breaches. Also
this separation removes the burden of building an emergency access system in the core of
the EHR system. Since enabling emergency access in EHR system may force the system
to compromise some security measures and introduce security holes, in order to give the
users the ability to override access policies and security rules in the system to gain access
to medical data when needed. By following our model we can first build an efficient EHR
system that focuses on preserving privacy and confidentiality with the ability to provide full
data records for normal daily usage. Then we can build a separate efficient emergency sys-
tem that focuses on delivering the needed data without any delay and preserving patient’s
privacy and confidentiality.
On the other hand, for an EHR system to be able to cover large areas and provide services
to customers all around the US, EHR system must be able to handle all requests from
patients and providers in a reasonable time, provide data replication and synchronization
for availability, provide services in crisis times, handle the huge data for all patients, auto
scale the resources to handle bottleneck times, and be fairly cheap. All those characteristics
and more are found in a database as a service in the cloud [6]. But by moving data to
the cloud, the data owners are relinquishing their complete control over their data and
giving private information to an unauthorized users. Handling medical data by a third party
requires extra measures by the data owners such as encryption to preserve privacy and
confidentiality which is covered by legal regulations such as HIPAA [23]. In addition to
the lack of authority over the data stored under their control, there are no guaranties that
the cloud providers will not act according to their benefits and needs to delete rarely used
data, tamper with the data, or hiding data loss incidents to preserve their reputations. For
examples [5] and [13] are incidents where data has been lost in two majors cloud providers
Google and Amazon.
4As a result of those threats and the need to preserve patients privacy, confidentiality, and
integrity, the system needs to provide a mechanism to prove data integrity and correctness
while being stored in the cloud, which can be provided by data auditing in addition to data
encryption. Our system will introduce a mechanism to audit the data while being stored
in the cloud and will give the users the ability to verify their data integrity and correctness
without the need of introducing a third party auditor like [30] or revealing any private data
to the cloud provider.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Cloud Computing
“Cloud Computing refers to both the applications delivered as services over the Inter-
net and the hardware and systems software in the data-centers that provide those services”
[6]. The cloud is divided into three major categories, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS), also it can be extended to
add Database as a Service (DaaS). The cloud offers a scalable and distributed storage sys-
tem that can help develop large scale applications to handle large scale databases and cover
large areas [2]. The cloud providers offer services that dynamically vary according to work-
load (Elasticity), charge the customers only for what they use (pay-per-use), low upfront
investment, low time to market, and transfer the risks from customers to the cloud. The
customers only store their data in the cloud and the providers distribute the data into differ-
ent data centers and guarantee an acceptable response time for customers with minimum
downtime. Comparing cloud providers with private storage systems that are managed by
local administration, cloud providers have dedicated hardware to provide the best service,
different kinds of security measures to defend against external attacks, up-to-date software,
and dedicated experts in every field to cover all the needs for the cloud providers. All those
benefits and more are provider to customers with very reasonable costs, which in most
cases cannot be covered by private businesses because of the high costs and complexity of
5building and maintaining such dedicated systems.
While these advantages make the cloud a perfect infrastructure for large and small appli-
cations, the cloud brings new security risks toward outsourced data. The fact that the cloud
provider is a third party storage system that does not have the authority to view or edit the
data is a risk by itself. Also the interests of the data owner may collide with the interests
of the cloud provider that may lead to harming the data itself. On the other hand, cloud
providers may also hide some incidents from the customers to preserve their reputation and
prevent customers from raising law suits against them. All the previous risks are internal
risks, but the cloud also introduces new external risks such as the fact that all different kinds
of data are collected in one place which will be an attractive target for hackers much more
than local small storage systems. Public cloud auditing [30] and data encryption [18] can
be used to protect the data against internal and external risks.
1.2.2 Encryption schemes
Encrypting data is the first and essential line of defense against attackers and unau-
thorized users. Data will be encrypted while being stored in the cloud to prevent cloud
providers from accessing or tampering the data. Also data will be encrypted while being
transferred between entities in the system or while being stored in some temporary locations
such as doctors local machines. The following sections describes the various encryption
schemes and their usage.
Symmetrical Encryption
Symmetric-key encryption schemes are schemes in which the encryption key and the
decryption key are the same. One of the schemes that follows symmetric-key encryption
is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [29]. In those schemes the user must share the
key with all the users who have the authority to view the encrypted data and if the user
needs to give different access permissions to different users then there is a need to encrypt
each part of the data with different keys and share each key with the authorized users only.
6Therefore, in a group of users each two users must have a unique key shared between them
for secured communication. Symmetric-key encryption systems consist of multiple rounds
of substitution-permutation networks, that is why it is fast and simple, but with a large key
and a good number of rounds, the system becomes secure and hard to break. However, the
system becomes too complicated and hard to manage when the number of users increases
and with the need of fine-grained access policies because of the huge number of keys and
the work needed by the users and the system to manage data access [8]. Symmetric-key
encryption will be used in the system to encrypt emergency report while being stored in the
cloud.
Public-Private Encryption
Public-Private encryption schemes are schemes that use two different keys for data en-
cryption and decryption. The user first generates a private key that should be kept secured,
and a public key which is released to the users. Any data that was encrypted by the public
key can only be decrypted by the private key and vice versa. RSA [28] is a famous public-
private encryption scheme. So if Alice wants to share data with Bob, she just needs to know
the public key for Bob and use it to encrypt the message. When Bob receives the encrypted
message he will use his private key to decrypt the message and read its contents. Therefore,
in a group of users, each user must have one pair of keys, a private one that is hidden from
the others, and a public key that is shared with all the users. The users in those schemes
should only manage their private keys, while the public keys can be kept in a shared place.
CP-ABE
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [9] is a public key encryption
scheme that enables the user to specify who can access the data when encrypting it by
constructing a fine-grained access policy and associate the policy with the data. Each user
in the system must have a private key associated with a list of attributes that describes the
user, the user can decrypt the data file if and only if her key’s attributes can satisfy the access
7policy that was associated with the encrypted data. CP-ABE consists of a master key, a
public key, a set of attributes, a set of private keys, and four fundamental algorithms (Setup,
Encrypt, Key Generation, Decrypt) in addition to one optional algorithm (Delegate).
• Setup: it only takes an implicit security parameter to generate both the Master Key
(MK) which is kept hidden from all users and the Public Key (PK) which is shared
with all users.
• Key Generation(MK,S): generates a user private key (SK) using the master key MK
and a set of attributes that describes the owner of the key S.
• Encrypt(PK,M,A): generates ciphertext (CT) for the message M using the public
key PK and associate it with a user defined access policy A such that only users with
keys that their attributes satisfy A can decrypt the ciphertext CT.
• Decrypt(PK,CT,SK): decrypts the ciphertext CT in association with the public key
PK and the users private key SK and generates the original message M if and only if
the the set of attributes S that is associated with the private key SK satisfies the access
policy A that was associated with the ciphertext CT.
• Delegate(SK,S’): generates another user private key SK’ from another private key
SK and associate it with a set of attributes S’ such that S ′ ⊆ S.
One Way Hashing Functions
A cryptographic hash function is a one way function that maps a large input data to a
small fixed size digest. The digest can be used for digital signature, message authentication,
and many other security application [25]. Example of hash functions is the SHA family
(SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512) [24] and lately the newest member of the SHA family SHA-
3 [14]. The characteristics of a good hash function are
• Easy to compute the digest from the message.
8• Impossible to generate the original message from its hash.
• Any small change in the message must change the hashed value.
• It is very hard to find two messages that have the same hashed value.
The hash functions can be used to prove data correctness and integrity by creating a
digest for the data before storing it in the cloud and keep the digest in a safe place. Later
when the user wants to prove data integrity she can calculate the digest for the stored data
and compare it with the old digest that was stored in a safe place, the two digests are equal
if and only if there were no changes in the original data.
1.2.3 No-SQL Databases
No-SQL is a no structure database that was developed to handle the huge, unstructured
data generated through the web that requires fast access and does not have a clean and
predefined structure [10]. No-SQL systems removed all the constraints and complex oper-
ations provided by Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS), so No-SQL does
not support complex operations and joins and does not require a predefined structure for
the data to be stored. This gives the NO-SQL the advantage of being fast and horizontally
scalable.
No-SQL provides a suitable infrastructure for a medical application, since there is no
standard or limit to how much information can be stored about a patient. Also it can be
looked at as a key-value pairs since there are no relations between medical data of a person
and another from providers point of view.
1.2.4 Electronic Health Records
“The electronic health record (EHR) is an evolving concept defined as a longitudinal collec-
tion of electronic health information about individual patients and populations. Primarily,
it will be a mechanism for integrating health care information currently collected in both
9paper and electronic medical records (EMR) for the purpose of improving quality of care”
[16]. In addition of the role that EHR systems play in health data sharing and simplifying
the process of accessing and searching medical records [16] [17], EHR systems also help:
• Improving quality and convenience of patient care.
• Increasing patient participation in their care.
• Improving accuracy of diagnoses and health outcomes.
• Improving care coordination.
• Increasing practice efficiencies and cost savings.
• Improving clinical and health services research and clinical education.
• Eliminate the physical storage requirements.
• Providing the potential to deliver a longitudinal record that can cover a long track of
medications and history for patients and provide comprehensive data across popula-
tions.
The ease of accessing and sharing medical data between providers through EHR systems
made it also easier for unauthorized users to access private data that was unavailable or
very hard for them to access before EHR systems (internal threats). The amount of private
and confidential data that is managed by EHR systems made them an active target for
attackers and hackers to gain access for sharing, selling, or tampering medical data (external
threats). Therefore, EHR systems in addition to traditional needs to preserve patients’
privacy, confidentiality, and security, must be able to protect the data and defend against
internal and external threats.
The Australian and the U.S. Models
Australia and the U.S. follow different architectures toward health information shar-
ing. [15]. In the Australian model, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, healthcare providers filter
10
Figure 1.1: Australian Model “Pull-Model”
health data before pushing it into a centralized data center. Thus, a summery of the critical
health data is formed and moved from a local health data repository into a centralized sys-
tem. In this model, providers have control over which information goes into the summary
report that will be shared with other healthcare providers. Therefore, during emergen-
cies, only the collection of summery reports will be accessed by providers that contains
only meaningful data. The Australian model focuses more on preserving the privacy of
patients by making sure that only the needed data is pushed and shared with other health-
care providers, however, the summery report may lack needed information for normal daily
usage of the EHR system such as management and financial data.
On the other hand, in the U.S. model, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, local health data held
by providers is replicated into a centralized data repository after obtaining consents from
patients to be shared with other providers. Thus, during emergencies, healthcare providers
can access the complete health data stored in the centralized repository. Though the U.S.
model focuses on making sure that all patient data is available for other providers for normal
daily usage of the EHR system, it raises privacy and confidentiality concerns specially with
emergency access.
Our proposed EHR model will combine the Australian and the U.S. models to provide
an efficient privacy-preserving system for emergency care purposes while providing full
functionality of an EHR system.
11
Figure 1.2: US Model “Push-Model”
1.3 Hypothesis
Using a single design to achieve a fully secured system that preserves privacy and con-
fidentiality with the ability to provide fast and easy access to emergency data, is almost
impossible without compromising some of the security features in EHR or without pro-
viding an easy way to override these security measures. Also even though encrypting data
while being at rest or transit is essential to protect the data and preserve privacy and confi-
dentiality, encryption is not enough by itself and extra measures should be taken to secure
data [11], because most of private computers have been compromised and users’ lack of
security knowledge. The first part of our hypothesis is that EHR systems should follow
two different architectures the first is for normal daily access and the other should be for
emergency access to be able to get the maximum capabilities in both architectures.
Using the cloud without data auditing and a mechanism to prove data integrity and cor-
rectness puts the system trust under suspicion and questioning since there is no guarantee
that the data was not tampered with. Our second part of the hypothesis is to make use of the
fact that we can use multiple cloud providers to distribute the risk and introduce the ability
to audit and prove the correctness and integrity of data by making each cloud stores audit
data about another provider.
In order to prove our hypothesis, a prototype system will be built for an EHR system that
uses CP-ABE to encrypt and secure medical data over the cloud with fine-grained access
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control, and an emergency access system that provides the ability to construct a report of
critical medical data for emergency access. The data will be split into categories and each
category will be stored into different cloud provider also each cloud provider will store a
hashed value for data that is stored in one of the other cloud providers. The system then
will give users the ability to test integrity and correctness of their data by comparing the
calculated hashed value for their stored data with the old hashed value for the same data,
that was stored in a different cloud (audit cloud).
1.4 Related Work
1.4.1 EHR system and emergency Access
Many EHR systems have been introduced using the cloud as a data storage service.
The Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) family as an encryption scheme to secure data on
the cloud and provide fine-grained access control to the users, such as [18] [4] [3] [22].
However, those applications focused on normal daily usage of EHR systems without paying
enough attention to emergency access and the impact of emergency access over privacy and
confidentiality of the data while being accessed. In the case of [18], the system will only
generate a temporary key in emergency cases that grants the user a temporary full access
over the patient data without prior authentication. Also, none of the systems introduced the
need for separation between emergency data and complete data records for patients during
emergency access.
On the other hand, [18] tried to introduce a multi-cloud EHR system architecture, but
the introduced system was, in fact, designed over a single cloud provider. The introduced
architecture only offered interfacing capabilities for other EHR systems to be able to access




Since the cloud providers are not the real owners of the data and they are not authorized
to edit, view, or delete the data, many systems were introduced to prove the ownership of
the data such as [7], or to verify that the data was not tampered with or deleted by proving its
integrity, such as [31]. However, those systems rely on third party auditors to store testing
data and keys and to do the verification for them. Using third party auditors may force the
users to reveal some private data to the auditors to be able to do their job, which violates the
privacy and confidentiality requirements for the system. On the other hand, systems such
as [30] were designed to preserve data privacy by making the third party auditors do their
job without the need to access any confidential data. Meanwhile, the fact that this system
depends on a third party auditor, which is assumed to be trusted to store the auditing data
and keys and to do auditing as required from them, is a weakness in the system.
1.5 Road Map
The remainder of this report discusses the implementation and analysis of the construction
of emergency report and how to audit the cloud. Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 describe the
detailed design and implementation of the system, respectively. Section 2.3 describes the
test results of how efficient the emergency report compared with issuing a temporary key
to access data. Section 4.1 and section 4.2 describes the current status of the prototype and





The proposed framework consists of three entities: a cloud provider (CP), a private se-
cured webserver (PSW), and healthcare providers’ private machines (HPM). Patient data is
divided into three main categories: medical data, personal data, and insurance data. Each
category has many sub-categories for achieving fine-grained access control. Data are stored
in a structured XML format (as shown in Figure 2.1). This XML format makes the pro-
posed framework simple to integrate with current EHR systems. Any current system needs
only to follow the formatted XML structure to be able to read from or write to our pro-
posed system, which makes it platform independent. Medical records are encrypted using
CP-ABE by the patients or healthcare providers before storing them in the cloud. Patients
access and manage their medical data via a web application, while healthcare providers
can either use the web application to view medical data and emergency reports, or use a
desktop version for full capabilities over accessible medical data.
The PSW is initialized by running the setup function of CP-ABE. The function creates
the Master Key (MK) and the Public Key (PK). The MK will be saved privately in the PSW
without revealing it to other users. On the other hand, the PK will be available for users
to be able to encrypt and decrypt data. When healthcare providers register in the system,
a desktop application will be installed into their private machines, and the machine will be
added to the list of authorized machines to be able to communicate directly with the cloud.
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Figure 2.1: XML format for Data before encryption
Figure 2.2: System Structure
The PSW then creates private keys for each registered healthcare provider with identifiable
attributes. Also, a unique identification value is given to all users to be able to access the
web version of the application, the identification values are also associated with the private
keys as an attribute. Patients can request access to the system only through the PSW sever.
Private keys and identification values will be created for patients to access the system and
decrypt their private data. Patients control who can access their medical data by editing
access policies. This can be done by requesting an update process in which PSW will
re-encrypt the data with the new access policy, then store it in the cloud.
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Figure 2.2 shows the main parts of the system and a high-level overview of the data
interactions between each part:
1. A user connects to PSW and provides required authentication data to access the sys-
tem, and request access to medical data.
2. PSW downloads the user’s encrypted data from the cloud using the user’s identifica-
tion value,
3. PSW will decrypt the data using the patient’s key and send the decrypted data over
secured channels to the users to view it in a web browser.
4. Healthcare providers’ machines can also access the cloud directly without access-
ing PSW for better response time. They load the encrypted data from the cloud by
providing the patient identification value, then their local machine can decrypt it if
their private keys satisfy the access policies associated with the encrypted data. The
providers can also edit the data and access policies, re-encrypt the modified data,
then send it back to the cloud.
2.1.1 Emergency Report
The construction of Emergency Report (ER) in our framework follows the push archi-
tecture in the Australian model described in subsection 1.2.4. The ER is generated by
healthcare providers by marking the required medical data as emergency data (as shown
in Figure 2.1) where some nodes have the attribute isEmergency=”1”. The nodes that are
marked as emergency will be copied to another XML file that forms the ER. After finishing
selecting all the required nodes for the ER, the system will generate an XML file and store it
in the cloud for the ER report. The report will be encrypted in the cloud using Symmetric-
key schemes, rather than using CP-ABE for fast access, and The symmetric-key will be
stored in the PWS server and in medical providers’ private machines.
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Healthcare providers can access the ER through their desktop application by only pro-
viding the patient identification value, providing that it is an emergency access. Also,
providers can access the ER through the web interface, but in this case, they have first to
provide a valid authentication for accessing the web before being able to load patient data
using patient identification.
Our system provides a hierarchical access policy since data is divided into three main cat-
egories: medical data, personal data, and insurance data; Each category is divided into sub-
categories. This hierarchy gives us the ability to define access policy at each level. Taking
medical data as an example, users can give access to all medical data by constructing a gen-
eral access policy; Then for each sub-category, users also can define another access policy.
The system will combine those two access policies into one by OR or AND, depending on
user needs. The final access policy will be {(GeneralAccess)(OR—AND)(SpecificAccess)},
which provides fine-grained access control.
2.1.2 Data Auditing
The system will be built over multiple cloud providers. The data in the system will
be divided between those providers, such that the system only knows what data is being
stored in each cloud. This architecture distributes the risk among multiple data providers
for normal use. The system can make use of this architecture to provide data auditing
without the need of a third party user to do the work and without the need for any extra
work from the user. This can be done by simply hashing the encrypted data before saving
it in cloud A and save the digest in cloud B (as illustrated in Figure 2.3). To provide a
mechanism to prove data integrity, the system provides users with an interface to be able
to either test one category or all the data in one request. When the user asks for a test to
prove integrity, the system will load the encrypted data from cloud A, hash it, then load the
old hash value that was stored in cloud B and compare them. This way, if the two hashes
are identical, then there was no modification in the data; Otherwise there was something
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Figure 2.3: Data Auditing
wrong.
Figure 2.4 shows a complete design for the system built over the three major cloud
providers (Google, Azure, and Amazon Web Service AWS). Also the figure shows data
transfer between each model and the state of the data while being transferred.
2.2 Implementation
A prototype of the system was built on Amazon Web Service (AWS) and Microsoft
Azure. The PWS server was built on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). DynamoDB,
a NoSQL database, was used as a storage center to store the encrypted medical data in
AWS, and NoSQL table service on Azure was used to store the encrypted personal data.
Meanwhile, AWS was used as an auditing server for Azure, and Azure was used to audit
AWS. The system was built using PHP5 over an Apache2 Server. The EC2 server was
configured with PHP5, Apache2, and CP-ABE setup. AWS SDK PHP2 was used to com-
municate between EC2 and DyanmoDB, and Windows Azure SDK for PHP was used to
communicate between EC2 and table service on Azure. For complete installation instruc-
tions, please see appendix A.
The prototype was built to demonstrate the functionality and usability of the system by
providing a simple web interface for both patients and medical provider. First, the system
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Figure 2.4: Complete System Design
provides an interface to create users by specifying the attributes that identify each user (see
Figure 2.5). Then the users can start accessing the system by providing their identification
value in the log-in page. A screen will appear for users where data can be viewed, edited,
or added (see Figure 2.6). Figure 2.6 explains the different parts of the main screen which
consists of:
1. Data Menu: Can be used to navigate among different data types, and to navigate
among each data type’s subcategories. When a user selects a subcategory, the client
will communicate with the server to load the data using the user key. The data will
appear if the user has permission; otherwise, a permission denial message will ap-
pear.
2. Action menu: Used to manage actions that can be done over data:
• New Tab: The data inside subcategories is stored inside tabs so users must first
create a new tab to add data into it. Tabs are only used to organize data inside
each subcategory.
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Figure 2.5: Create New User
• Edit General Access: For achieving fine-grained access control and to make it
easier for the user, access policy was divided into two main categories (General
Access and Category Access). General access is used to add shared policy over
the main category. In our example where the user has selected medical data (as
in Figure 2.6), the general access policy will be applied to all the subcategories
inside that category (see Figure 2.7 for an example about constructing access
policy.)
• Edit Category Access: Used to apply a specific access policy over one of the
subcategories (see Figure 2.8). In the first line in the category access, there is
an extra join operation, which will be used to join this category access policy
with the general policy. Therefore, the user can join the general policy with the
category policy with either AND or OR operations according to the user needs.
• Save Changes: All the changes that the user did to the data or access policy will
not be reflected to the cloud unless the user hit (save changes). Even if the user
moved between categories or subcategories, data changes will be saved in the
session until hitting (save changes). When the user clicks on (save changes), the
system will search for all the changes that has been made to the data, encrypt
the data, calculate the hash digest, then save the data in the data cloud and the
digest in the audit cloud.
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Figure 2.6: EHR User Interface
3. New Section: Each tab contains multiple sections to organize data. The user can add
sections to the tab by using the (New Section) button and by providing a title for that
section. In Figure 2.6 (Medication 1) represents a section in (Current Medication)
tab.
4. The user can add data to sections by clicking on the blue plus sign near the section
title (see Figure 2.6 mark 4). The user can provide a label and text for each line of
data.
5. In Figure 2.6, the data that have green Es preceding them are marked as emergency
data. The others are not included in the emergency report. The user can mark the
data as emergency by clicking on the red E preceding the data, or clicking the green
E to remove the data from the emergency report.
After uploading all the data to the cloud, the user can start building the emergency report
by selecting the needed data,then the system will construct an emergency report (in XML
format). When saving the report, the system will encrypted it using AES with a private key
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Figure 2.7: General Access Policy
Figure 2.8: Category Access Policy
only available at PWS and providers’ registered machines. Firgue 2.9 shows an emergency
report that was constructed from both medical data and personal data for a random patient.
In the current prototype, the report is stored in a NoSQL dynamoDB table in AWS, but for
availability and access speed, the report can be distributed to more than one cloud provider
if needed.
In the NoSQL databases, the system uses two keys to navigate between different users
and to uniquely identify subcategories in a single record for a patient. The main key (pri-
mary key) is the user unique identification value, which is used to uniquely identify patient
records. This key can also be used to scan and pull all data records for a patient using scan
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Figure 2.9: Emergency Report
Figure 2.10: Data in The Cloud
methods. The second key (range key) is the subcategory title (see Figure 2.10), which is
used to uniquely identify each subcategory for a single patient. The range key is used to
pull a single subcategory when a user navigate among subcategories for better response
time.
2.3 Testing
In order to test the idea of building an emergency report in an EHR system and how
efficient it will be compared to just issuing an emergency key and decrypting all medical
data, 10 patients, 2 doctors, and 2 nurses accounts were created. Then some dummy med-
ical data were added for each patient. The EHR system was tested with CP-ABE access
management by creating different access polices for each patient, and was tested for each
doctor to access patients Data. Doctors were able to access only the authorized data, and
patients were able to create fine-grained access policy over subcategories in medical data
and personal data. These scenarios verified that the system works as a basic EHR system
with fine-grained access control over CP-ABE.
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In order to test the emergency report functionality, different kinds of reports were created
for patients. One of the patients had all of her medical and personal data marked as emer-
gency, while other patients had different number of their attributes marked as emergency
data. Then these three scenarios were tested:
• Asking unauthorized doctors to access emergency data. The doctors were only able
to access the emergency reports and were only able to see the data that was marked
as emergency. There was no need to access the total medical records for patients, and
no need for revealing any unnecessary data.
• The doctors was able to update data that was marked as emergency, and changes were
reflected correctly to the emergency report after saving the changes.
• Removing some marked data from emergency report, was also reflected correctly to
the report after saving the changes.
In order for us to compare between the two systems, we created two scenarios. In the
first scenario, every single attribute in the patient record was marked as emergency data,
This proves that our system provides the same access to all data as the traditional systems
do, but with extra overhead when updating data, since the data is replicated in two places.
Then the system was tested for access speed. First we used the emergency key to access
emergency data (as in the traditional system using temporary key) and got an average time
of 0.44 seconds to decrypt all the data. On the other hand, the system was able to access
the same data in 0.031 seconds when reading emergency data in the emergency report that
was encrypted by AES.
The other scenario resembles the real scenario where the needed medical data for treating
patients is a small part of the complete medical record of the patient. In this scenario half
of the attributes in the medical record for the patient were marked as emergency data. The
first part of the test, when accessing the system using the emergency temporary CP-ABE
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key, the decryption process took an average time of 0.43 seconds. This time was almost the
same as the first scenario, which is expected since temporary key method in both scenarios
is accessing the same size of data. On the other hand, accessing the emergency report data
took only 0.028 seconds, which is also expected since the system is accessing half the data
that was used in the first scenario.
Audit functionality was tested by designing the system to work under two modes. In
the first mode, which is the normal mode, the system will audit the data by first encrypting
the medical record, then it will calculate the hash digest for the encrypted data. after that
the system will save the encrypted data in the data cloud, and the digest in the audit cloud.
However, the other mode saves only the encrypted data without calculating its hash digest.
The second mode resembles modifying the data by a third party such as the cloud provider
or an attacker without going through the system. In order to be able to verify the data in-
tegrity, an interface was created where a patient ID can be provided and request a verifying
process. The system will then load the encrypted data for that patient from the data cloud,
calculate the hash digests each subcategory, and then compare them with the old digests
that were stored in the audit cloud. Finally, the system will generate a report about which





Cryptography is becoming less and less important in the world of defending data and
systems, as Shamir (one of the fathers of public-key cryptography) stated at the 2013 RSA
conference [11]. Therefore, the proposed EHR system provides another level of defense
against attacks, especially for EHR systems in emergency access were data is easily ex-
posed. The system protects privacy and confidentiality by giving the ability to limit the
amount of data that is exposed to users in emergency access situations. These limita-
tions prevent attackers from gaining access to information that may harm both users and
providers, yet the system was able to do its job by listing all the critical data needed for
emergency.
On the other hand, speed is a very important factor when developing a national scale
EHR system, especially for emergency access to be able to deliver on-time emergency
treatment. The huge size of medical data and the large number of patients adds a huge
overhead on the EHR core. This overhead makes the system slow and unusable, especially
for emergency access. Therefore, other measurements and core designs must be taken
to improve the system. The tests that were done in section 2.3 prove that the response
time (0.031 sec) for emergency reports was much faster than the response time (0.44 sec)
for using temporary keys in CP-ABE. This speed makes our system more suitable for a
national scale EHR system. The speed in our system results from:
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Figure 3.1: CP-ABE vs. AES
• Using symmetrical encryption schemes in securing emergency report, which is the
simplest and fastest form of encryption. This compares to traditional EHR systems
that use CP-ABE to secure data in the cloud, which is very much slower than symmet-
rical encryption. This was proven in the testing done section 2.3, in [4]. Figure 3.1
shows the difference in speed between AES and CP-ABE when used to encrypt dif-
ferent sizes of files.
• The size of the data needed to be encrypted and decrypted plays a major role in the
speed of the operations. Since the size of the data blocks encrypted in the schemes
is constant, increasing the size of the data generates more and more blocks, which
means slower operations. Therefore, by marking only the critical data and generating
smaller reports, emergency access will be faster. The effect of the file size on speed
can also be seen in Figure 3.1.
• The number of operations needed to access the data. In the case of EHR systems
without emergency report, every subgroup that contains critical data must be de-
crypted. In our system, medical data has twelve subgroups, which means we need
twelve decryption operations to be able to access all the needed data. CP-ABE by
itself is slower than AES, and the need to apply it more than once slows the system
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Figure 3.2: Relation between Speed and Access Policy Complexity
very much. Comparing this number of operations with the need of only one opera-
tion to access emergency report, in addition of using AES which is faster, makes our
system much faster in emergency situations.
• Access policy complexity also plays major role in the speed of CP-ABE. Figure 3.2
measures the encryption speed of CP-ABE algorithm when encrypting a 10 MB file
using different access policies. As we can see, the speed of the encryption decreases,
while the size of the access policy increases.
The separation between EHR and emergency access is not only good for emergency
access, but also for EHR systems. Before this separation, EHR systems were forced to
provide a mechanism that enables users to access data without permission in case of emer-
gency. This mechanism introduced a burden and some security holes in the system. There-
fore, by removing this burden, EHR systems can now focus on creating a more secure
system that focuses on protecting privacy and confidentiality for patient data by forcing
access policies over data as it supposed to be without exceptions.
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3.2 Key Management
Key management in the system handles two types of keys. The first one is related to the
CP-ABE keys and its daily use in the EHR system. While, the other one is related to AES
encryption scheme and its use in emergency access. Also each type can be analyzed from
both patients and providers point of view.
3.2.1 CP-ABE
There are three types of keys in CP-ABE master (key, public key, and private key):
• Master Key: A private key that is used to generate users private keys. This key is
only stored in the PSW which acts as the key authority in the system. This key is
kept private and it will not be shared with any user, provider, or third party that may
have access to the system.
• Public Key: A public key that is needed to encrypt or decrypt data in CP-ABE sys-
tems. This key will be shared with all users, providers, and systems that may have
access to the system.
• Private Key: A unique key that will be generated for each entity, when it join the
system. This key uniquely describes each entity with the associated attributes. The
users will use their keys to gain access to data that was authorized for them. This key
should be accessible only by its owner.
3.2.2 Emergency Report key
The emergency report section uses symmetrical key encryption, where only one key is
required for encrypting and decrypting data. The key will be stored only in two places. The
first place is the PSW server, in order to be able to access the emergency report through the
web interface. The second place is the registered private machines for each provider who
is authorized to gain emergency access.
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3.2.3 Provider Keys
Providers can use the system either through their private desktop applications or through
the web interface. When using the private desktop application, only regular authentica-
tion is required, such as active directory or user name and password through the provider’s
database, to access the system. After authentication, the provider can start accessing medi-
cal data using the system, since the required keys (public key, private key, and Emergency
key) are stored securely in the application.
On the other hand, there are two modes for the providers when they use the web interface.
If the provider wants to access only emergency access through the web interface, a user-
name and password can be used to authenticate providers. After that the provider can access
patients emergency data since the required key is already stored in the server. However,
providers need to upload their private CP-ABE keys to PSW, as an extra step, in order to
gain access to complete medical records. Therefore, the web interface provides fast and
easy way to access emergency data for any patient, without the need to download or upload
any application or keys, and provides a reasonable mechanism to access complete records.
3.2.4 Patient Key
Patients can only use the web interface to gain access to their data, which is encrypted
using CP-ABE. For simplicity and better user experience, the patients will only be authen-
ticated using user-name and password. The system will either load a locally stored key for
the patient, or recreate the access key, since both the public and master key are stored in
PSW. In order for the patients to gain access to their encrypted data, the system modifies
the access policy for each sub-category by attaching the patient’s identification key to the
access policy. The original access policy looks like (GeneralAccess [OR/AND] Category-
Access), which defines the attributes of the users who have access to the data. while, The
modified version looks like ((GeneralAccess [OR/AND] CategoryAccess) OR PatientId),
with this modification, the patient key ,which only contains the identification key for the
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patient, can access the encrypted data.
3.2.5 Key Analysis
The key management in our system enhance the user experience. For providers, access-
ing medical data for daily normal use will be done mostly from their private machines.
Those machines already registered and authenticated in our system and store the required
keys locally. Therefore, providers are not required to carry and provide their private keys,
which minimize the risk of compromising those keys. On the other hand, emergency ac-
cess must be accessible anytime, anywhere, and as fast as possible. Therefore, medical
providers can use the web interface to log-in the system and gain access to emergency data.
Since the symmetrical key is already stored in the PSW server, there is no need for up-
loading or generating any temporary keys. However, if the provider wants to access the
complete records through the web interface, the CP-ABE private key for that provider must
be uploaded.
In order to make sure that the web interface can be usable for providers to gain access to
complete medical records, a comparison between the key size and the number of attributes
attached to the key was done. Figure 3.3 shows the relation between the key size and the
number of attributes attached to that key. As seen in the figure, the initial size of the key
with one attribute is less than 0.5 kb, and adding extra ∼250 bytes to the key size for each
addition attribute. This comparison shows that the key is very small and can be uploaded
easily to the server.
One may argue that since the key with one attribute (patient key) is very small, then
why cannot we also ask the patients to upload their keys. The lack of security awareness,
usability,the easiness of losing such a small file or share it with others, and the diversity
of patients background make it safer to stick with id and password authorization instead of
asking the users to upload their keys.
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Figure 3.3: Relation between Key Size and Number of Attributes
Figure 3.4: Different Architectures for Cloud Auditing
3.3 Data Audit Architectures and Calculations
Data auditing plays a major role in any cloud system, since the data is not under the
direct control of the owners anymore. Data auditing in the cloud was introduced before
(such as [30]), but this system requires a trusted third party to handle the auditing work.
Also, the system requires some extra work from the users themselves. Our auditing system
makes use of the multi-cloud infrastructure to build a self-auditing system without the need
of any third-party auditor. In our system, each cloud provider plays two roles. The first role
is a data storage system in which our system stores part of patient data. The second role is
an auditor in which each cloud provider stores the auditing data for one of the other clouds.
Figure 3.4 illustrates three design architectures for auditing in the cloud, as follows:
• Figure A: Illustrates the architecture in which the PSW server will send the data ID
to both clouds requesting data. After loading the old digest from the audit cloud
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and loading the raw data from the data cloud, the system will calculate the digest
for the raw data locally, then compare it with the old digest. The problem with this
architecture is the need to download the complete raw data from the data cloud to be
able to calculate the digest.
• Figure B: Describes the architecture in which the PSW sends the ID to both servers.
The PSW will receive the old digest from the audit cloud, while the data cloud will
first calculate the digest for the raw data and send it to the PSW instead of the raw
data. The digest is much smaller and can be downloaded very fast. Then the PSW
will compare between the two digests to make sure that there were no changes to the
raw data. This architecture can be used with a semi-trusted data cloud. The semi-
trusted cloud is trusted to calculate the digest correctly, but not trusted to store the
data correctly.
• Figure C: The previous two architectures use hash algorithms, such as SHA512, to
calculate the digest without any requiring a key from the user. However, The archi-
tecture in Figure 3.4-C uses a cryptographic hash function in which the user should
provide a key for the hash function in order to get the correct digest. Therefore, PSW
will first load the old digest and the key used to calculate that digest from the audit
cloud; PSW will then send the ID and key to the data cloud. The data cloud will use
the key to calculate the new digest and send it to PSW. PSW will compare between
the two digests to verify data integrity.
The architecture in Figure3.4-C can be used with untrusted cloud providers. An
untrusted cloud provider can calculate the digest of the data when it was uploaded.
When users want to validate their data, they will receive the old digests, which do
not reflect the current state of the data. Therefore, using Figure C architecture, the
cloud providers will be forced to calculate the digests when users ask for a validation
process, not when uploading the data, since this cannot be done without the keys that
are stored in the audit cloud.
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Load Digest Load Data Calc Digest Total Time
1 0.56 1.78 0.007 2.34
2 0.12 1.22 0.007 1.35
3 0.12 1.13 0.007 1.26
4 0.10 1.74 0.007 1.85
5 0.11 1.59 0.007 1.70
6 0.10 1.60 0.007 1.71
7 0.10 1.55 0.007 1.65
8 0.14 1.71 0.007 1.86
9 0.12 1.52 0.007 1.64
10 0.11 1.68 0.007 1.80
Table 3.1: Operations Length in Figure 3.4-A
Table 3.4 lists an average time comparison between the three architectures in Figure 3.4.
Each operation were done 10 times, Figures [3.1,3.2,3.3]. All results are in seconds and
are done over a (1 MB) file.
• Load Digest: The time needed to load the data from the audit cloud. In this case,
Azure was the audit cloud.
• Load Data: The time needed to download either the raw data (in Figure A case), or
to load the calculated digest for the raw data (in Figure B and C cases) from the data
cloud. In this case, AWS was the data cloud.
• Calc Digest: The time needed to calculate the digest for the raw data.
• Total Time: The total time needed by the server from receiving a request from the
client, until sending the results into response.
The difference between design A and design B is the place where the new digest is being
calculated. Design A downloads the complete record then calculate its digest. This design
advantage lies in removing the burden of calculating the digest from the cloud or the data
server, but the fact that it needs to download the complete record is a big disadvantage.
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Load Digest Load Data Calc Digest Total Time
1 0.46 0.14 0.009 0.60
2 0.09 0.13 0.008 0.22
3 0.11 0.12 0.008 0.23
4 0.09 0.12 0.008 0.21
5 0.10 0.12 0.008 0.22
6 0.09 0.12 0.008 0.21
7 0.09 0.11 0.008 0.20
8 0.10 0.13 0.008 0.23
9 0.09 0.12 0.008 0.21
10 0.10 0.11 0.008 0.20
Table 3.2: Operations Length in Figure 3.4-B
Load Digest Load Data Calc Digest Total Time
1 0.23 0.13 0.008 0.36
2 0.10 0.14 0.008 0.23
3 0.10 0.13 0.008 0.23
4 0.10 0.11 0.008 0.21
5 0.10 0.12 0.008 0.22
6 0.13 0.14 0.008 0.26
7 0.10 0.10 0.008 0.20
8 0.09 0.12 0.008 0.20
9 0.13 0.11 0.008 0.24
10 0.09 0.12 0.008 0.21
Table 3.3: Operations Length in Figure 3.4-C
Load Digest Load Data Calc Digest Total Time
Figure A 0.16 1.55 0.007 1.72
Figure B 0.13 0.12 0.008 0.26
Figure C 0.12 0.12 0.008 0.24
Table 3.4: Average Times Comparison between Cloud Auditing Architectures
Therefore, this design is applicable in local network where transferring data is not a bot-
tleneck. Whereas, design B calculate the digest for the complete record in the cloud and
download the digest only. Design B is better than design A in our case, since data transfer
is a bottleneck in our case and we can depend on the cloud powerful resources to calculate
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the digest of the data, but the owners will lose their full control over the calculation oper-
ations. Therefore, design C comes to make sure that the cloud provider is doing their job
as it should be without any cheating. Also design C can be improved to protect our system
from any cooperation between the audit cloud and the data cloud by either storing the keys
locally or in a third cloud provider, since already our system was designed to distribute data





• The application is only a prototype which was built to show that our hypothesis does
have an add value and applicable in providing the current EHR systems tasks in
addition of preserving patient’s privacy and confidentiality.
• The web application is used by both doctors and patients without any distinguishes
between them, we need to separate between both interfaces and the capabilities pro-
vided for each type.
• The desktop application for medical providers was not built since we were able to
provide the jobs that need to be done through the web interface.
• Only medical data and personal data were implemented in the system we need to
include other parts such as insurance, medical history, family history...etc.
• The system was only built over Azure and AWS since those two were enough to prove
the audit capabilities and enough to prove the main concept behind the hypothesis.





The idea of moving data to the cloud and not have it locally, may be rejected by some
medical institutions, especially large ones. In order to solve such an issue, the system can
provide a replication mechanism, in which each medical provider can mark its clients. The
system will start replicating each provider’s list to their local database and keeps updating
the list with any new changes. The system also should give users the ability to track the
list of providers that have local copy for their records, and give the users also the ability to
delete or prevent some providers from storing their data locally.
4.2.2 Identification List
Identification list is a list that contains pairs of words, such as (Adam:Patient First Name).
The first word is an identification word such as patient name, disease name, doctor name
...etc. The second word is a pseudonymous word that hides the identification meaning of
the first word without removing the meaning of the data. This list can be used to hide iden-
tification information in emergency reports or later in any other report that the system can
generate. This way we can make sure that the reports that are easily accessed can only be
accessed through the system. Otherwise, the data has no identification information, which
is an extra measure to preserve privacy and confidentiality.
4.2.3 Emergency Declaration System
The system needs an advanced infrastructure to be able to identify emergency situations
and users who can access emergency data. The system should prevent using emergency
data in normal daily situations to prevent data miss-using. Also the system should be able
to identify emergency situations without any overhead.
39
4.2.4 Alert and Notification System
The system needs an alert and notification system to give both providers and patients the
ability to track their data. Alerts can help users to prevent any miss-use of their data. Also
the alert system can be used to identify suspicious activities. The user should be notified
when a provider requests a local copy of their data or accessed their emergency report. The
system should be able to detect suspicious actions from users and notify administrators to
take action as soon as possible to prevent any extra damage.
4.2.5 Research Reports
The idea of creating a summary report of needed data and hide identification data, with-
out altering the meaning of the information, can be used to provide research reports. The
system can provide the ability to generate reports like the emergency report, by giving users
the ability to mark the data that can be used. The system will then hide the identifying in-
formation, then push the reports to research facilities. Those reports can be used in research
or generating reports and charts without the need to reveal any private or secured data.
4.3 Conclusion
Creating an emergency report from patient data to be accessed in emergency situation, is
an additional measure to preserve patient’s privacy and confidentiality. The system mostly
depends on the cooperation between the patient and medical provider, and between medical
providers themselves to achieve its main goal. If the providers did not take time to mark
the emergency data and just marked everything then the system becomes useless, it would
become a burden on the EHR system and becomes a major security hole in the system.
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This manual will help the user to create the web server with CP-ABE, PHP5, Apache,
AWS sdk, and Azure sdk. The installation was done on Ubuntu Server 12.04.1 LTS which
is an EC2 server in AWS.
A.1 Preparing the Server
1. we need to install essential packages for the server (make, gcc, g++ compilers):
$ sudo apt-get update
$ sudo apt-get upgrade
$ sudo apt-get install build-essential
$ gcc -v
$ make -v
2. Installing required libraries for the system:
• Installing M4 a macro processor language needed for arithmetic operation li-
brary (GMP):
$ sudo apt-get install m4
• Installing OpenSSL library:
$ sudo apt-get install openssl
• Installing development version of OpenSSL to get access to encryption libraries:
$ sudo apt-get libssl-dev
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• Install Glib library which is needed in CP-ABE installation:
$ sudo apt-get install libglib2.0-dev
A.1.1 Installing GMP
“GMP is a free library for arbitrary precision arithmetic, operating on signed integers,
rational numbers, and floating point numbers” [12].
1. Download GMP version 5.1.1:
$ sudo wget ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gmp/gmp-5.1.1.t
2. decompress the library:
$ tar xjf gmp-5.1.1.tar.bz2
3. To install the library, move inside the folder then call
$ ./configure --disable-share --enable-static
$ make
$ make check
$ sudo make install
Note: You have to disable the shared functions and enable the static ones, otherwise
CP-ABE libraries will not work (configure –disable-share –enable-static)
A.1.2 Installing PBC
PBC is a pairing-Based Cryptography library, which is built over GMP library and de-
signed to be the infrastructure for pairing-based cryptosystems [21]. For the system we
need both the development version and the user version:




2. Download development version:
$ sudo wget
http://voltar.org/pbcfiles/libpbc-dev\_0.5.12\_amd64.deb
3. libgmp3c2 shared library was needed by PBC, to install it:
$ sudo apt-get install libgmp3c2
4. Install user version:
$ sudo dpkg -i libpbc0\_0.5.12\_amd64.deb
5. Install development version:
$ sudo dpkg -i libpbc-dev\_0.5.12\_amd64.deb
A.2 Installing and Testing CP-ABE
CP-ABE is divided into two libraries,libbswabe (a library implementing the core crypto
operations) and cpabe (higher level functions and user interface) [19]. We will first install








3. Installing libbswabe after decompressing the folder and moving inside it:
$ sudo tar xzf libbswabe-0.9.tar.gz
$ ./configure
$ make
$ sudo make install
4. Installing cpabe after decompressing the downloaded file and moving inside it:
$ sudo tar xzf cpabe-0.11.tar.gz
$ ./configure
Before calling make, we need to edit the MakeFile that was created from the first
command. The installation did not work without it, I think it is something due to the
changes in the GMP library (new version). In the MakeFile change the following:
LDFLAGS = -O3 -Wall \
-lglib-2.0 \
-Wl,-rpath /usr/local/lib -lgmp \




LDFLAGS = -O3 -Wall \
-lglib-2.0 \
-Wl,-rpath /usr/local/lib -lgmp \
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$ sudo make install





2. Generate user keys:
$ cpabe-keygen -o Doc1_priv_key pub_key master_key \
Job_Doctor CS_department RIT_Organization \
FirstName_Adam ID_D1
$ cpabe-keygen -o Patient1_priv_key pub_key master_key \
Job_Student FirstName_Jack LastName_Tom \
RIT_Organization Id_P1
$ ls
master_key pub_key Doc1_priv_key Patient1_priv_key
3. Encrypt a file called medicalData.xml:
$ ls
pub_key medicalData.xml
$ cpabe-enc pub_key medicalData.xml
(RIT_Organization and (Job_Doctor or Id_P1))
$ ls
pub_key medicalData.xml.cpabe




$ cpabe-dec pub_key Doc1_priv_key medicalData.xml.cpabe
$ ls
pub_key Doc1_priv_key medicalData.xml
A.3 Preparing Web Server
Prepare the web server by downloading:
• Apache server latest version:
$ sudo apt-get install apache2
• PHP5.* or later: some functions that were used in the system were not introduced in
previous versions:
$ sudo apt-get install php5
• configure php5 with apache2:
$ sudo apt-get install libapache2-mod-php5
Note: you have to restart Apache after this.
• AWS SDK needs Curl to be installed with php5, to install it:
$ sudo apt-get install php5-curl
By installing all these libraries the server should be ready to be used as a web server. In
order to be able to run the system, the user needs to use AWS PHP SDK and Azure PHP
SDK. Please follow the steps in http://aws.amazon.com/sdkforphp/ to install
the latest AWS SDK PHP (Note: in the current implementation the system needs both PHP
2 and PHP 1 SDKs). In order to get Azure PHP SDK please follow the installation steps
in http://www.windowsazure.com/en-us/develop/php/ to install the SDK.
Note: If the folder provided in the CD has been used, all the libraries for AWS and Azure
are included.
50
A.4 Preparing the Cloud
A.4.1 AWS
• Create an account in AWS and get the authentication key and parameters into the
system.
• In DynamoDB create the following tables with Hash key and Range key respectively:
– PatientData: PatientId (String), ItemId (String).
– PatientDataAudit: PatientId (String), ItemId (String).
– Users: PersonId (String).
– EmergencyReport: PatientId (String)
A.4.2 Azure
• Create an account in Azure cloud service and get the authentication key and param-
eters into the system.
• Create a new storage service (In the prototype case called ehr).
• In the storage service create the following tables (the system by default adds Partition





• The key file is placed /EMR/EMR/EHR.pem
• In generalFunctions.php located in /EMR/EMR/ please change the function





– ssl.certificate authority: which is (EHR.pem)
2. Azure Authentication: change the connection string variable inside the file RefAzure.php
located in /EMR/EMR/ to include:
• Account Name: in prototype case EHR.





The complete code listing is available on the attached disc.
